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THE RUSSELLIAN THEORY OF TIME* 
L. NATHAN OAKLANDER 
There have been many objections raised against the Russellian 
theory of time. ! Recently, it has been criticized by George 
Schlesinger in an article entitled "Philosophical Equanimity and the 
Stillness of Time. ''2 Schlesinger's criticism is that there are certain 
undisputable phenomena that are completely unexplicable and 
unintelligible on the Russellian view, and since any adequate 
philosophy of time must be reconcilable with these phenomena, he 
concludes that the RusseUian view is inadequate. Furthermore, he 
argues that the view of time associated with McTaggart is preferable 
to the Russellian view because the McTaggartian can make 
intelligible the undisputable phenomena in question. Schlesinger's 
criticism of Russell and defense of McTaggart are important and 
cannot be ignored by anyone who, like myself, adopts a Russellian 
view of time. Consequently, my task in this essay will be to provide 
a defense of the Russellian view that is limited to the objections that 
Schlesinger raises agianst it. I shall proceed by dividing the paper 
into two sections. In the first section I shall explain what I take 
the Russellian view to be and show how on it the undisputable 
phenomena can be understood. In the second section I shall consider 
Schlesinger's claim that the undisputable phenomena cannot be 
understood on Russell's view and attempt to show that his argument 
is unsound because it is based on a misunderstanding of the 
Russellian view. 
The aim of Schlesinger's article is to establish that ultimately we 
should "have to side with McTaggart [and against Russell] and 
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concede that time must be moving . . . .  ~,s Schlesinger claims, 
correctly I believe, that it is an impression deeply felt by all of us 
that time flows relative to the present, and he thinks that this 
impression must be correct since it is based upon some undisputed 
phenomena. 4 According to Schlesinger, the phenomena that are 
"strongly indicative" of the temporal universe having a movement 
from the future through the present and into the past, are our 
different attitudes toward events in the future and events in the past. 
Concerning the first set of attitudes we may note that a very painful 
experience that is known to have happened to us in the past, say a 
painful operation, is when contemplated thought of with relief. As 
we sometimes say, "Thank goodness that's over!" On the other 
hand, when we know that an equally painful operation is something 
that will occur in our future our attitude is one of dread and 
anxiety. Similarly, we often feel nostalgia over pleasant events that 
have happened and joy over events that we expect to happen. In 
both sorts of cases, there seems to be a kind of conceptual connec- 
tion between the different attitudes and the nature of time. Events 
that ~ire contemplated with nostalgia are not just those that are past, 
but they are events that are receding or moving away from us. Those 
that are contemplated with joy are often those that not only are in 
the future, but are understood as coming towards us and about to 
overtake us; about to be in the now, in the stream of our lived 
experience. Analogously our relief that a highly disagreeable 
experience is over is somehow conceptually connected with our 
belief that the experience is moving away from us and "that our feel 
of dread. . ,  is explained by the fact that the agonizing experience is 
seen to be approaching us and is known to be about to overtake 
us."s It is such undisputable attitudes and experiences as these that 
provide, according to Schlesinger, strong evidence against the 
Russellian conception and for McTaggart's conception of time. 
At the outset we may acknowledge that the difference in 
attitudes that Schlesinger describes do in fact exist. Moreover, I 
think that we must also admit that the differences in attitude imply 
that "time moves." But the whole question centers around what is 
meant by saying that "time moves." Although our attitude of dread 
implies that we conceive of events being first in the future and then 
moving toward us so that they are eventually happening to us, our 
attitude of dread is far from clear as to how we are to understand 
the "flow"of events from the future to the present. It is the task of 
philosophy to enable us or at least to aid us in understainding what 
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is meant by time's "movement." In a passage from Russell's lectures 
on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" he says: 
The process of sound philosophizing . . . .  consists mainly in 
passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we 
feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which 
by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague 
thing that we start from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of  
which that vague thing is a sort of shadow. ~ 
If  we apply Russell's views on "sound philosophizing" to the 
problem of time we may say that, if he knows what he is about, 
the Russellian need not deny the deeply felt impression that time is 
moving. 7 Thus, he need not dispute the "undisputable phenomena" 
that Schlesinger employs to justify our belief in the transiency of 
time. But the obvious truth that time is moving, though something 
that we feel quite certain of is, nonetheless, vague and ambiguous. 
Thus, the task of philosophy is to reflect on that vague truth, and 
arrive at, to use Russell's phrase, "the real truth of which that vague 
thing is a sort of shadow." The point here is that we cannot identify 
our deeply entrenched belief in the movement of time with 
McTaggart's account of  it. To believe that time moves is not ipso 
facto to believe that there is a special temporal particular - the 
"now" - that moves along a series of events, or that there are the 
properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity which events possess 
and continually change with regard to. Our deeply entrenched 
beliefs about time are not as sophisticated as McTaggart's view of 
time in whatever way we interpret it. Consequently, although our 
different attitudes towards the past and the future do imply that 
time has a trainsient aspect in some sense, they do not imply that 
time moves in the sense explained by McTaggart. It may be the case 
that time moves or has a transient aspect in the sense in which the 
RusseUian says it does, and that gives rise to the following two 
questions: (1) What is the RusseUian view of time, and (2) In what 
sense does time move or have a transient aspect, according to the 
Russellian view? 
We will have occasion to delve more deeply into the Russellian 
view when we consider Schlesinger's objections to it, but for the 
present we may content ourselves with indicating the essential 
aspects of that view. The most fundamental aspect of the Russellian 
view is that temporal relations are simple, unanalyzable, and 
irreducible. As I understand the underlined words the Russellian 
view implies that (i) "earlier than" cannot be defined in terms of 
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"past," "present," and "future." To be able to give such a definition 
or reduction would show, according to one conception of 
philosophy, that one need not countenance temporal relations in 
one's ontology. Thus, the Russellian maintains that an adequate 
ontology of  time requires temporal relations, and that temporal 
properties and/or temporal individuals alone will not  do. The 
Russellian view also implies that (ii) temporal relations do not 
require that their relata have temporal properties. On the Russellian 
view x can be earlier than y even if it is not the case that x and y 
each have one of  the temporal characteristics of  pastness, present- 
ness, or futurity.a The RusseUian view also maintains that (iii) there 
are no non-relational temporal properties of pastness, presentess, and 
futurity. 
The Russellian does not deny that we truly predicate "past," 
"present," and "future" of  events, but he maintains that that does 
not imply there are temporal properties named or referred to by 
these predicates. Indeed, he denies that such temporal properties 
exist and historically has offered several different analyses of  
temporal predicates to demonstrate this. 9 The most plausible and 
1 would say correct view is that the word "now" or "present" names 
a certain time. What time? The time at which the word is uttered, or 
written down. Thus, for example, to say that "event e is now 
occurring" when uttered or written at time t~ expresses the fact that 
the event in question is occurring at t~, and to say that "even e is 
now occurring" when uttered or written at t 2 expresses the fact that 
the event in question is occurring at t2, and so on. Similarly, to say 
that "event e will occur in the future" when uttered at t~ expresses 
the fact that the event in question occurs (tenselessly) later than t~. 
Finally, to say at t~ that "event e has occurred in the past" when 
expressed at t~ expresses the fact that the event in question occurs 
(tenselessly) before t~. On the Russellian view, the nowness of  
events occurring at t~ is nothing more than the time at which these 
events occur, namely, t~. Nowness is not,  on this view, a temporal 
particular that "shifts" from time to time. Nevertheless, we need not 
claim that our different attitudes toward the past and future are 
mistaken or irrational, and we need not deny the deeply held belief 
that time is moving from the future into the present. To see why this 
is so we shall turn to our second question. 
In what sense, then, does time move or have a transient aspect, 
according to the Russellian view? How could a Russellian account 
for our experience of  time's movement? Consider, for example, the 
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event of  the return of  my wife, Linda, after a one month vacation in 
the Philippines. I have been antiticpating the event for three weeks, 
and now I anticipate it once more with joy. All the while I sense that 
her return is coming closer and closer and that eventually it will be 
taking place. I may describe my experience as an experience of  
time's moving, but what does that mean? On the Russellian view, a 
plausible answer would be the following: There is a certain event e 
(Linda's return to the U.S.) that occurs (tenselessly) at t n. At say t l ,  
I wish it was n o w  t n or I say to my friend, "I am looking forward 
to Linda's return at t n . ' '  Then, at a later time t2, I wish and say the 
same thing. Finally, suppose, at t n (the time at which event e occurs 
(tenselessly) I experience the joy that I have been anticipating. The 
Russelian would say, as would everyone else, that time (event e) 
moved from the future to the present. The truth that underlies that 
vague statement would, however, be the following: My wish or 
utterance occurs (tenselessly) at tl and the event that I wish to 
occur is later than t~. At t2, my wish or utterance occurs (tenseless- 
ly), but the temporal span (duration) between t2 and tn is less than 
the temporal span between t~ and tn. Finally, at tn, the experience 
o f  joy occurs (tenselessly) and so does the event e that I have been 
anticipating at t~ and t2. On this account, the passage of  time is 
reflected in the fact that different wishes or utterances occur (tense- 
lessly) at different times and at different temporal distances from 
the time at which event e occurs. N o w ,  at tn+ 1, I may experience 
nostalgia due to the "passing of  the joyful event into the past" and 
the Russellian would unpack the kernel of  truth in that phrase by 
saying that the experience of  nostalgia occurs (tenselessly) at tn+ 1 
and the joyful event e that I am nostalgic about occurs (tenselessly) 
at tn, and t n is earlier than tn+ 1 . As the temporal distance between 
tn and n o w  (i.e., the time referred to by the use of  the word "now"  
in the utterance "I am now nostalgic") increases, the event e may be 
said to recede or pass more and more into the past. Thus, on the 
Russellian view, there is a justification of  our different attitudes 
towards past and future events, and more importantly, there is a 
clear and intelligible sense in which time has the transiency required 
by our deeply felt impression. 
In order to get a clearer understanding of  the Russellian view it 
will be useful to consider some arguments against the account of  it 
just given. The first argument may be stated as follows: The series 
of  real numbers has certainly no extra particular travelling along it 
but one can say that "going" along it in one direction we find the 
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numbers increasing and "going" along it in the other direction we 
find the numbers decreasing. So the obvious answer of  McTaggart 
would be that similarly for the Russellian who denies the existence 
of  a moving NOW one may speak equally well about going along the 
time series in one direction as in the other. Clearly seen from the 
other direction tl succeeds t2 which succeeds t3 which succeeds t4 
and so on. Thus, I could just as justifiably talk about being nostalgic 
toward e; all the while I sense Linda's return receding further and 
further into the future! Since the conclusion of  this argument is 
absurd, if the Russellian view is committed to it, then the Russellian 
view must be rejected. Fortunately, the argument is either invalid, 
unsound, or question begging. 
A key premise in the first argument is that "for the Russellian 
who denies the existence of  a moving NOW one may speak equally 
well about going along the time series in one direction as in the 
other." There are at least two things that the key premise could 
mean: (1) It could mean that on the Russellian view if A is earlier 
than B, then B is later than A, or (2) It could mean that on the 
Russellian view if A is earlier than B it could still be the case that B 
is earlier than A. If we interpret the key premise as (1), then it is 
true but it does not entail that I may be nostalgic about an event in 
the future. If we interpret the key premise as (2) then the first 
argument is valid, but it rests upon a premise that is either false or 
question-begging. To see what is involved in this last point let us 
turn to the ontological issue surrounding the "direction" of  time. 
One way of  understainding the ontological issue surrounding the 
"direction" of  time is to put it in the context of  what constitutes 
the difference between space and time. There is a peculiar difference 
between spatial and temporal relations that Broad once expressed in 
a passage worth quoting at length: 
The peculiarity of  a series of  events in Time is that it has not 
only an intrinsic order but also an intrinsic sense. Three points 
on a line have an intrinsic order, i.e., B is between A and C, or 
C is between B and A, or A is between C and B. This order is 
independent of  any tacit reference to something traversing the 
line in a certain direction. By difference in sense I mean the 
sort of  difference which there is between, say, ABC and CBA. 
Now points on a straight line do not have an intrinsic sense. A 
sense is only assigned to them by correlation with the left and 
right hands of  an imaginary observer, or by thinking of  a 
moving body traversing the line in such a way that its presence 
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at A is earlier than its presence at B, and the latter is earlier 
than its presence at C.t~ 
For Broad it would be nonsense to suppose that a temporal series 
could be going in one direction as well as the other since what 
distinguishes the temporal series from a spatial series is that only the 
former is a series of events that have an intrinsic sense or direction 
without tacit reference to some "imaginary observer" or "moving 
body." M. Black refers to the same distinction between space and 
time when he says that, 
time is not "isotropic," in the way that we have seen space to 
be . . . . .  It does indeed seem that the meaning of the claim 
that A happened earlier than B does not depend upon the 
speaker's position or point of view - or on the point of view 
of anybody or anything else. It seems to me nonsensical to 
suggest that if A is earlier than B, it might after all still be the 
case that B is earlier than A. H 
It is, however, precisely that suggestion that the first argument 
makes against the Russellian view. Thus, on the only interpretation 
that would make the first argument valid, the crucial premise is false 
and hence the argument is unsound. 
Since there is the distinction between space and time that Broad 
and Black discuss, questions arise as to tis ontological basis or 
explanation: "What in reality are the truth conditions for the 
direction or intrinsic sense of time?" Alternatively, "What is the 
difference between a spatial and a temporal series?" By briefly 
considering these questions we can see in what way the first 
argument is question begging. For the Russellian the direction of 
time is wholly constituted by the unique asymmetrical relation of 
succession. The appeal to a simple temporal relation to give time a 
direction or sense is one and only one of several possible ontological 
explanations of the direction of time. McTaggart spoke of the 
fundamental feature of time as being constituted by the changing of 
events with respect to the characteristics of pastness, presentness, 
and futurity. For Broad, the crucial feature of a temporal series 
is that events in it acquire temporal relations through the continual 
increase in the sum total of existence. ~2 For S. McCall the crucial 
feature of time is in the progressive discarding of those possible 
worlds which do not become actual. ~3 In short, there are numerous 
accounts of the ontological ground of the direction of time, i.e., of 
the ontological basis of the distinction between space and time. All 
views that maintain that without a special kind of change there 
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would be no temporal relations (nor a temporal series) are views that 
maintain that becoming is absolute. Absolute becoming in its various 
disguises are different ways of  accounting for the direction o f  time 
that are anti-Russellian. Thus, if one claims that without absolute 
becoming there is no direction to time, then one would also claim 
that on the Russellian view there is no direction to time. In other 
words, the argument is that since the Russellian view spatializes time 
we may speak of  time as going in one direction as well as in the 
other, and consequently we may be nostalgic over events in the 
future. Such an argument is, however one that begs the question for 
it assumes that the Russellian view spatializes time in a literal and 
pernicious sense because it does not ground the direction of  time in 
absolute becoming. 
That the direction of  time is founded upon absolute becoming is 
an essential tenet o f  McTaggart and other so-called A-theorists, and 
is nicely stated by Broad in the following passage. 
It seems to me that there is an irreducibly characteristic 
feature of  time, which I have called "Absolute Becoming." It 
must be sharply distinguished from qualitative change, though 
there is no doubt a connection between the two. In the 
experience of  a conscious being Absolute Becoming manifests 
itself as the continual supersession of  what was the latest phase 
by a new phase, which will in turn be superseded by another 
new one. This seems to be the rock-bottom peculiarity of  
time, distinguishing temporal sequence from all other instances 
of  one-dimensional order, such as that of  points on a line, 
numbers in order of  magnitude, and so on. 14 
Clearly, from the A-theorists point of view, without absolute 
becoming in some form or another there would not be a temporal 
series, but a series indistinguishable from a spatial one. Yet a 
McTaggartian cannot assume that central tenet in an argument 
against Russell without assuming what needs to be porved. The 
A-theory thesis that on the RusseUian view time is essentially like 
space, is at the core of  Schlesinger's argument against the Russellian 
view, but before we return to that let us consider another objection 
to our statement of  it. 
The second argument against my account of  the Russellian view is 
even more important then the first since it goes to what is perhaps 
the central point of  Schlesinger's paper. It may be stated as follows: 
Because of  strong psychological reasons an impression may have 
been formed in my mind that there is a tiger outside my house and 
consequently I dread to open the door. But as soon as I am reasoned 
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with and it is clearly demonstrated to me that there is no tiger 
anywhere within miles of  my house I shall - if I am rational - over- 
come my fear. Now, it may be argued that my account of  the 
Russellian view succeeds in explaining how according to Russell 
the impression of  the movement of  time arises even though in 
objective reality there is no temporal particular that actually moves. 
Nevertheless, I would still leave unexplained why an enlightened 
person upon realizing that his dread of  a terrible event in the future 
relentlessly "coming" or "moving" toward him is merely an 
impression, since in fact nothing dreadful is really approaching him, 
does not succeed in overcoming his dread. 
As in the first argument, the above argument contains a crucial, 
but ambiguous premise, namely, that on the Russellian view, there is 
no objective "coming" or "moving" of  future events toward us and 
that nothing dreadful is really "approaching" us. That premise may 
mean (as the critic seems to intend it to mean) (1) that on the 
Russellian view there is no temporal particular that moves along the 
temporal series or more generally, that there is no absolute 
becoming. Or, it may mean (2) that for the Russellian there is no 
objective basis whatsoever for the movement of  time; that on the 
Russellian view time does not have an intrinsic sense. If we interpret 
the crucial premise in the second sense, then the second argument is 
valid: it would be irrational for us to fear or dread certain "future" 
events, and it would leave unexplained the reason for our irrational 
fear. However, the second interpretation is either false or question 
begging. It is false since the Rusellian need not deny either that 
events move toward us or that time has an intrinsic sense (direction). 
For the Rusellian events do move and time does have an intrinsic 
sense and the basis of  these facts about reality is that there exists a 
genuine temporal relation of  succession that obtains between events. 
On the other hand, if the critic maintains that "time moves" or has 
an intrinsic sense if and only if there is a temporal particular, the 
"now," that actually moves (or some other version of  absolute 
becoming), then he is begging the question against the Russellian. 
The second argument fares no better if we take the crucial premise 
to be interpreted as (1), because then the argument is invalid. It 
is true that the Russellian denies that becoming is absolute, but it 
does not follow that an enlightened person who believes that 
McTaggart's analysis of  time's movement is wrong would be 
irrational to continue to dread some future event that he believes is 
coming toward him. When one is rationally convinced that a terrible 
event is not  coming toward him in the sense that there is a temporal 
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particular that is actually moving toward him (or some other version 
o f  absolute becoming), it is still understandable why he might still 
fear the event. For, the person might realize that there is another 
(RusseUian) way in which an event may come toward him. What 
the RusseUian view claims to demonstrate is not  that it is irrational 
to believe in the objective reality of  "becoming" but that it is 
irrational to believe that becoming is absolute, e.g., that in objective 
reality there is a temporal particular that actually moves. The 
irrationality of  that belief is not,  however, to be identified with the 
irrationality o f  the belief that events are approaching us or 
becoming. 
Finally, we may understanding the flaw of  the second argument 
against the Russellian by noting that there is a basic and 
fundamental disanalogy between the two situations described in it. 
In the spatial case there is an impression of  dread with no objective 
bases and hence once the person involved knows that there is no 
objective basis for his fear, it is irrational for him to persist with it. 
In the case of  time, however, it is not  on the Russellian view irrat- 
ional to continue to fear a future dreadful event even after I have 
been convinced that there are some obscure metaphysical senses 
(absolute becoming) in which it is not  moving toward me. To make 
the case of  time analogous with space one would have to construct 
a case in which the dreadful event was believed to immediately 
follow one's anticipation of  it, but that in objective reality it was 
either much later than the anticipation of  it or earlier than the 
anticipation of  it (because say the event in question happened 
already, but was forgotten). Then, once a person was informed 
of  either o f  these alternatives, he would, if he is rational, over- 
come his fear of  the event. At this point, unfortunately for the 
critic, the argument against Russell breaks down. For there is no 
reason to suppose that the person would not succeed in overcoming 
his fear once it is shown to be irrational. Of course, the person may 
still dread the event, just like the person may still fear the tiger 
(knowing that it is miles away), but it is not incumbent upon a 
philosopher to explain such irrational beliefs, and it is certainly no 
objection to the Russellian theory of  time that people sometimes 
have them. 
If the two arguments just considered against the Russellian view 
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are unsuccessful, and the RusseUian account of the passage of time 
is intelligible, then Schlesinger is mistaken when he claims that our 
different attitudes of  joy and relief, and dread and nostalgia are 
evidence for McTaggart's view of time and evidence against Russell's 
view of time. A question that remains, however, is why Schlesinger 
made the mistake? We can best answer that question by considering 
Schlesinger's objections to the Russellian view and uncovering the 
confusions upon which they are based. 
II 
Schlesinger's first main claim against the Russellian view is that it 
is incompatible with the generally held belief that time is moving. 
He develops his criticism by first explicating Russell's view. He says, 
According to Russell, there is no room for any transiency as 
all temporal relations between events themselves and events 
and moments are permanent and no temporal particular 
changes its fixed position in the temporal series of moments. Is 
McTaggart's view, on the other hand, is compatible with the belief 
that time is moving and for that reason is preferable to Russell's. In 
characterizing the McTaggartian view he says, 
According to McTaggart, however, it is possible to look upon 
the 'now' as a particular which shifts its position relative to the 
series of events in the direction of the future. This movement 
is manifested by the fact that at one stage it is a fact that El is 
in the future which means that El is a point in time which is 
later than the time at which the "now' is situated. Yet at 
another stage it ceases to be a fact and the 'now' reaches the 
same position in time at which El [is] situated and the two 
are simultaneous; then of course, it becomes true that El is 
in the present. 16 
On Russell's view there is no temporal particular - the "now" - 
which shifts its position relative to the series of events, and 
consequently Russell believes that McTaggart's view is mistaken. It 
does not follow, however, that a Russellian must deny that the 
temporal universe has a transitory aspect. To deny McTaggart's view 
on time is not equivalent to denying the movement o f  time. 
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Schlesinger, however, thinks that a Russellian must deny the 
impression shared by all of  the transiency of time, for he says, 
Now while nobody denies that a deeply felt impression that 
time indeed flows relative to the present is a part of our 
mental make-up, many philosophers have already cited very 
strong reasons why this impression must be false. 17 
Schlesinger is mistaken since it is not true that philosophers of the 
RusseUian bent have denied this deeply felt impression, but rather 
they have denied McTaggart's interpretation of it. Schlesinger is 
identifying Mc-Taggart's conception of time with our deeply felt 
impression about time's movement. If that is legitimate then he is 
correct in saying that a Russellian must deny the impression that 
time is moving. But to assume that it is legitimate is to beg the 
question against the Russellian. According to the Russellian it is 
perfectly rational to believe in the movement of time, what is 
irrational and mistaken is McTaggart's account of it. 
Interestingly, Schlesinger recounts several of the standard, but 
nonetheless strong arguments against McTaggart's understanding of 
the movement of time. Yet, because he identifies McTaggart's view 
of time with our deeply entrenched impression concerning time's 
motion, and since his is unwilling to give up the impression that time 
moves, he is unwilling to give up McTaggart's understanding of it. 
As Schlesinger says in the following passage: 
[I] t is conceivable that we should be forced to acknowledge 
that moments and events have certain features which are 
essentially features of particulars that partake in motion. In 
that case we should have to side with McTaggart and concede 
that time must be moving even though the movement in 
question must be a very peculiar one, very unsimilar to 
movement in general or one which we cannot even hope ever 
completely to understand. So what we have to ask ourselves 
is whether this deeply entrenched impression concerning 
time's motion is soundly based on some undisputed 
phenomenon. Is 
The undisputable phenomena that Schlesinger uses to support our 
impression of time's movement and hence McTaggart's view are our 
different attitudes toward the past and the future. It is these 
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different attitudes that form the basis of Schlesinger's second 
argument against the Russellian view. 
Schtesinger correctly notes that our attitude of relief towards a 
painful experience that is over and anxiety toward a painful 
experience that is yet to come can be explained only if we suppose 
that time is moving from the future into the present and from the 
present into the past. He goes on to say, 
But it is only according to McTaggart that it is legitimate to 
think of events as engaged in the process of moving toward 
or away from the present. As we have already said, according 
to Russell time is essentially like space in which all relations 
are fixed. If it is given that I have a painful experience at a 
spot which is one mile to my left and also one at a spot which 
is one mile to my right, from this we cannot derive that there 
must be a difference in my attitude toward these two 
experiences. The spatial relations of these two relations are 
symmetrical with respect to my position and knowing them 
alone does not warrant that I should be concerned more by 
the one than by the other. Similarly, when an unpleasant 
experience occurs at a given temporal distance from the time 
at which this token occurs, why should it matter which 
direction this experience lies? 19 
The overriding argument is that since Russell's view cannot account 
for, justify, or explain our different attitudes towards the future and 
the past, whereas McTaggart's view can, it follows that McTaggart's 
view is preferable to Russell's. The argument is unsound because it is 
based upon the ultimately unacceptable premise that according to 
Russell, time is essentially like space. To see why this premise is 
ultimately unacceptable we must turn to a closer examination of 
Schlesinger's account of the dispute between Russell and McTaggart 
on the nature of time. 
According to Schlesinger, the dispute between McTaggart and 
Russell is essentially an ontological one, for it concerns the nature 
of  temporal relations. Schlesinger says, 
There are basically two different views on the nature of 
temporal relations that exist; one is due to McTaggart, the 
other to Russell. According to McTaggart, temporal particulars 
possess, in addition to the commonly agreed relations, some 
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very special ones, while Russell denies this. The opponents of 
Russell regard his temporal universe as essentially impover- 
ished while Russellians hold that their opponents admit into 
their universe nonexistent properties. 2~ 
According to Schlesinger, McTaggart and the Russellian's agree that 
temporal particulars possess the temporal relations of earlier than, 
later than, and simultaneous with. The very special ones that 
MdTaggart affirms and Russell denies are those that obtain between 
the "now" or the "moving present" and the series of events gener- 
ated by the commonly agreed relations. On McTaggart's view, the 
same event is, at different times, earlier than, later than, and simul- 
taneous with the "now." For Russell, however, the "now" does not 
exist and consequently, there are no changing temporal relations. :t 
Schlesinger also characterizes the controversy concerning tem- 
poral relations in terms of the different kinds of temporal statements 
that exist. He says that both views agree that some temporal state- 
ments are B-statements, that is statements which "if true at any time 
[are] true at all times, and if false at any time [are] false at all 
times,":: e.g., "P is earlier than Q." The disagreement is over A- 
statements, that is, statements that change their truth value, e.g., 
"P is present." McTaggart argues that time and change require 
A-statements and Russell argues that time and change do not require 
them. On Russell's view, the putative A-statement "P is present" is 
no more than an abbreviation of the B-statement "P is (tenselessly) 
simultaneous with this token" or if uttered at t~, that "P is (tense- 
lessly) at t, ." 
Thus, on Schlesinger's interpretation, there is a basic disagree- 
ment and a basic agreement between McTaggart and Russell. They 
disagree over the status of the "now" and the changing relations 
generated by its "movement," and they agree that B-statements 
express facts about temporal relations between and among partic- 
ulars. It seems to me, however, that the disagreement between 
Russell and McTaggart is much deeper and fundamental than 
Schlesinger's characterization would lead us to believe. The dispute 
is ultimately over what Schlesinger infelicitously calls "the com- 
monly agreed relations." According to the Russellian, temporal 
relations between particulars are unanalyzable and irreducible to 
non-relational properties possessed by the particulars so related. 
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According to McTaggart, however, temporal relations are reducible 
and analyzable in terms of non-relational properties. In other words, 
Russell affirms and McTaggart denies that there are temporal rela- 
tions in the ontological sense. As we shall see, not only McTaggart's 
writings, but paradoxically, some of Schlesinger's other writings on 
time also support my interpretation of the Russell-McTaggart 
dispute. 
Let us begin by considering some of McTaggart's remarks con- 
cerning the nature of temporal relations, At the beginning of his 
discussion of time in The Nature of  Existence, McTaggart notes that 
positions in time appear prima facie to form two series. They form 
an A series, i.e., "that series of positions which runs from the far 
past . . .  to the present, and then from the present, t h r o u g h . . ,  to 
the far future, ''23 and they also form a B series, i.e., "the series of 
positions which runs from earlier to later, or conversely .,24 He also 
notes that we usually contemplate time by the help of a metaphor 
of spatial movement. Either we take "the B series as sliding along a 
fixed A series," or we take "the A series as sliding along a fixed 
B series. ''25 It is claims such as these that lead some commentators 
to hold that McTaggart construes time as involving both temporal 
relations and temporal properties. But there are other claims that he 
makes that cast serious doubt upon that interpretation. Consider 
the following where McTaggart says that "the distinction between 
past, present, and future i s . . .  more fundamental than the distinc- 
tion of earlier and later. ''26 1 submit, that to say that temporal 
properties are more "fundamental" than temporal relations means, 
for McTaggart, that temporal relations are analyzable in terms of 
temporal properties, but not vice versa. To put McTaggart's point 
linguistically, we may say that the fundamental nature of temporal 
properties reveals itself in that the B-expression "earlier than" may 
be defined in terms of A-expressions like "past," "present," and 
"future," but that A-expressions cannot be defined in terms of 
B-expressions. Indeed, McTaggart offers a definition of "earlier than" 
when he says that "the term P is earlier than the term Q, if it is ever 
past while Q is present, or present while Q is future.'27 
The linguistic point concerning the definability of "earlier than" 
has ontological implications. McTaggart argues that there cannot be 
a B series without an A series. The thrust of his argument is that if 
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we remove the A series from time, then there cannot be a series of  
events standing in temporal relations because it is the A series, or 
more accurately, a series of  A series, that "makes" or "generates" a 
B series out of a non-temporal series. In other words, on McTaggart's 
view, the only transitive asymmetrical relations that exist are non- 
temporal, and it is the becoming of events, that is, the changing of 
events from being in the future, to being in the present, to being in 
the past, that generates temporal relations. In short, on McTaggart's 
view, there are no simple, unanalyzable temporal relations. There is 
some clear textual evidence that bears out my interpretation. He 
says, 
The meridian of Greenwich passes through a series of  degrees 
of  latitude. And we can find two points in this series, S and 
S', such that the proposition "at S the meridian of  Greenwich 
is within the United Kingdom" is true, while the proposition 
at S' the meridian of Greenwich is within the United Kingdom 
is false. But no one would say that this gave us change. Why 
should we say so in the case of the other series [i.e., the B 
series]? 
Of course there is a satisfactory answer to this question if we 
are correct in speaking of the other series as a time-series. 
For where there is time, there is change. But then the whole 
question is whether it is a time-series. My contention is that i f  
we remove that A series from the prima facie nature o f  time, 
we are left with a series which is not temporal, and which 
allows o f  change no more than the series o f  latitudes does. 2s 
Precisely the same point is made in a later passage: 
. . .  the series of earlier and later is a time series. We cannot 
have time without change, and the only possible change is 
from future to present, and from present to past. Thus until 
the terms are taken as passing from present to past, they 
cannot be taken as in time, or as earlier and la ter . . .  29 
Thus, although McTaggart speaks of a B series, it does not exist 
ontoiogically. My interpretation of McTaggart is given more cre- 
dence by noting that it coincides with Broad's interpretation in 
his Examination o f  McTaggart's Philosophy. Broad says that 
McTaggart's view might be put most clearly and fairly as follows: 
There is a set of terms such that at any moment every A- 
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characteristic belongs to one or other of them, each of them 
has one and only one A-characteristic, and no two of them 
have the same A-characteristic. Each of these terms changes 
perpetually in respect of its A-characteristic in the direction 
from greater to less futurity, through presentness, to greater 
and greater pastness. These changes are so adjusted that the 
algebraical difference between the A-characteristics of  any two 
terms remains constant and independent of the absolute 
values of their A-characteristics. To say that X is "so much 
earlier than" Y at any moment means simply and solely that 
the algebraic difference between the A~haracteristics of  X 
and of Y is so-and-so at that moment. Since this algebraical 
difference is constant, X will be exactly as much earlier than 
Y at every moment as it is at any moment.3~ 
McTaggart asserts the fundamental nature of the A series and 
claims that temporal relations are definable in terms of it. In a recent 
article we find that Schlesinger agrees with McTaggart's analysis of 
temporal relations and attempts to vindicate it. He argues that 
"B-statements, e.g., 'P is earlier than Q' are in fact definable in terms 
of a disjunction of A-statements along the lines McTaggart has 
suggested. ''a~ We shall consider his definition later, but now let us 
note that Schlesinger views himself as vindicating McTaggart by 
providing an adequate definition or reduction of B-statements. 
Since, however, to define or reduce a B-statement in terms of a dis- 
junction of A-statements might be interpreted (as Broad and I have 
done) as ontologically eliminating temporal relations, it follows that 
Schlesinger might have construed McTaggart as attempting to 
eliminate RusseUian temporal relations from the ontological nature 
of time. If he did, then his interpretation is correct since for 
McTaggart there are no unanalyzable temporal relations. Where 
Schlesinger goes radically wrong is in supposing that Russell and 
McTaggart partially agree concerning the ontological nature of time. 
One may object to my interpretation of McTaggart and thus to 
my criticism of Schlesinger's account of the Russell-McTaggart 
dispute by claiming that McTaggart did not intend to ontologicaily 
eliminate temporal relations in terms of temporal properties, but 
rather to establish only that unanalyzable temporal relations are 
dependent upon changing temporal properties. In other words, 
379 
L. NATHAN OAKLANDER 
McTaggart and Schlesinger in offering definitions of  "earlier than" 
could be asserting that temporal relations are irreducible and un- 
analyzable, but that without absolute becoming (e.g., changing 
A-characteristics, the moving now, and so on), temporal relations 
cannot exist. This weaker alternative is Broad's own view in his 
Examinat ion  and he states it nicely in the following passage: 
Even if we reject the view that "X is earlier than Y"  means 
that there is a difference in the A-characteristics of  X and Y 
and that this difference is positive, there remains another 
alternative which would suffice for McTaggart's purpose. 
It might be suggested that the relation "earlier than" can hold 
only between terms which have A-characteristics; just as 
harmonic relations can hold only between terms which have 
p i t c h . . .  In fact, to use an expression of Meinong's, we might 
be able to see that B-relations are "founded upon" differences 
in the A-characteristics of the related terms. 
This view seems to me to be a highly plausible one, and I know 
of no positive argument against it. If  it were accepted, we 
should have to grant to McTaggart that there could not be 
B-relations between terms unless the terms had A-character- 
stics, even if we refused to admit that B-relations are definable 
in terms of A-characteristics and their differences. 32 
The weaker interpretation of McTaggart and the official view of 
several other A-theorists is that both Russellian temporal relations 
and non-relational temporal properties exist, but I shall argue that 
McTaggart and other A-theorists cannot consistently admit Russellian 
temporal relations into their ontology. In other words, McTaggart 
and Russell do not agree on the ontological status of temporal 
relations. 
We may begin to see what is involved by noting that McTaggart 
and other A-theorists differ from Russellians on the fundamental 
issue of what it is for something to exist. 3a For the A-theorists, 
"to exist" means "to be present." Since what is not present or not 
happening now does not exist, it follows that for the A-theorists, 
the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. The 
Russellian, on the other hand, denies that existence is a tensed 
notion. For him all events ("past," "present," and "future") and 
everything else that is, exists tenselessly. In other words, "present- 
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ness does not confer any kind of ontological distinction upon 
events. ''a4 These different accounts of existence lead to different 
accounts of temporal relations: The Russellian maintains that 
temporal relations are descriptive relations since they obtain if and 
only if their relata exist .  Since, however, on the A-theory only the 
present exists, it follows that what succeeds or precedes the present 
does not exist. Thus, for the A-theorist, the temporal "relation" of 
succession is a peculiar, atypical relation that can connect what 
exists with what does not exist. Indeed, since two events in the past 
(future) may be such that one is followed by the other, it follows 
that on the A-theory, temporal relations can obtain between events 
that do not exist, as Consequently, since the Russellian theory of 
temporal relations implies that the relata of temporal relations 
must exist, and the A-theory implies that temporal "relations" can 
connect existents with non-existents, it follows that RusseUian 
temporal relations are ontologicaUy different from McTaggart's. In 
short, for McTaggart, there are no Russellian temporal relations. 
It is of no avail to suggest that McTaggart thought that the past, 
present, and future exist in the Russellian tenseless sense. For if we 
say that then either there is, for McTaggart, no "genuine change" 
and hence no temporal relations, or there is "genuine change" with 
tenseless existence (that is, events change from existing (tense- 
lessly) in the future, to existing (tenselessly) in the present, to exist- 
ing (tenselessly) in the past), and that leads to a contradiction. ~s 
In either case, there are no Russellian temporal relations. Thus, the 
basic disagreement between Russell and McTaggart is whether 
there are simple and unanalyzable temporal relations or whether 
temporal relations are generated by the movement of the "now." 
In this context a question that immediately arises is: "Why would 
Schlesinger mistakenly think that Russell and McTaggart even 
partially agree on the nature of time? " The answer to this question 
will lead us directly to the fundamental flaw in Schlesinger's argu- 
ment against Russell and therefore is worth considering at some 
length. 
All philosophers of time, whether they are followers of McTaggart 
or Russell, agree that time necessarily involves temporal relations, 
but not all philosophers agree that statements that describe a tem- 
poral relation between two events, i.e., B-statements, are "time- 
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lessly," "eternally," permanently," or "always" true or false. For 
example, during one stage in his musings on time, Broad main- 
talned that before an event comes into existence it does not have 
any temporal relations to anything since he claimed that the future 
does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be a relatum of any 
relations including temporal relations. 37 For Broad, after an event 
comes into existence it joins up with the sum total of  existence 
(the past and the present) and becomes later than past events and 
remains later than those events forever after. Thus, for Broad, a 
statement such as "P is earlier than Q"  is neither true nor false at the 
time when P is present and Q is future, but it becomes true and 
remains true thereafter when Q comes into existence. On the other 
hand, Russell and McTaggart both agree that statements describing 
temporal relations between events are "timelessly," or "perma- 
nently," etc., true or false. But even though they completely agree 
concerning the "permanent" and "unchanging" truth value of  
B-statements it does not follow that they even partially agree con- 
cerning the ontological nature of  time. To see once more why this is 
so we must attend to an ambiguity in the notions o f  "permanently," 
"timelessly," "eternally," and "always" true or false. 
At first glance, to say that a statement has a "permanent" or 
"unchanging" etc., truth value has a reasonably clear meaning. It 
means that the sentence used to make it is true (or false)whenever 
or at every time it is uttered or written. But what could be the basis 
or condition for a statement being true at every time? There are at 
least two possibilities: Suppose we adopt the Augustinian hypothesis 
and assume that before God created the heaven and the earth there 
was no time. 3s Suppose further that the heaven and the earth will 
persist throughout all of  time. That is, suppose the heaven and the 
earth are individuals that endure forever. Then, the statement that 
"the heavens and the earth exist" is "permanently" true or true 
whenever it is uttered, and the basis of  its truth are individuals - 
the earth and the heavens - that exist at every time. In other words, 
a statement may be "permanently1 " t r u e  meaning that there exists 
at every time or throughout all o f  history something that is the basis 
of  its truth. Consider next another statement that is "permanently" 
true and has an "unchanging" truth value, namely, "Two plus two 
equals four." Suppose that we adopt the Russellian hypothesis and 
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assume that such a truth asserts a relationship between and among 
universals, a9 Then, although the statement is true at every time, 
the basis for its truth is not something that exists at every time, but 
rather it is something that does not exist in time at all. Its truth is 
based upon something, a state of affairs, that exists apart from and 
independently of time. Thus, by calling "Two plus two equals four" 
eternally2, timelessly2, or permanently 2 true, we mean that it would 
be true even if time did not exist. 
The distinction being alluded to can perhaps be elucidated by 
comparison with Chisholm's analogous distinction between states of 
affairs and the concretisation of states of  affairs. According to Chis- 
holm, states of affairs are abstract and eternal objects, they are con- 
nected with time only insofar as they are instantiated or concretized, 
that is, only insofar as they have occurrences or instances that obtain 
in time. Chisholm says, 
. . .  the state of affairs which is Socrates walking does not 
come into being when he begins to walk and doesn't ceas~ 
to be when he ceases to walk. Rather, we have said it is a~ 
abstract object that exists throughout eternity. And this  a 
entirely consistent with saying that it occurs at certain t i r~s 
and places and fails to occur at other times and places. 4~ 
To "exist throught eternity" is an ambiguous phrase. It can mean 
either to "exist at every time," or "exist apart from time." Since 
to exist at every time would necessitate obtaining at or occurring 
at every time, it is clear that Chisholm does not intend the state of 
affairs that Socrates walks to be eternal in that sense since Socrates 
is not always walking. Thus, we may conclude that for Chisholm, 
"to exist throughout eternity" means to exist "timelessly" or "apart 
from time." It must be acknowledged, however, that on Chisholm's 
view a state of affairs may have instances that obtain at some 
times and fail to obtain at others. Now, if in addition to "timeless" 
states of affairs, we suppose that some states of affairs may have 
instances that collectively "obtain throughout all of time" then we 
can draw a distinction between statements that are permanently~ 
true because they are about some one thing (or some series of 
things), that (collectively) exists at every time, and statements that 
are permanently: true because they are about states of affairs that 
exist throughout eternity. The distinction between these two differ- 
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ent kinds of  eternal or permanently true statements is crucial to a 
correct understanding of the complete disagreement between the 
Russellian and the McTaggartian view of time. 
According to my interpretation, Russell and McTaggart both 
agree that, say, "The death of Plato is earlier than the death of  
Aristotle" is permanently true B-statement. They would how- 
ever, disagree concerning the kind of B-statement it is because they 
would disagree about the nature of  the state of affairs that is its 
truth maker. For the Russellian, B-statements more closer resemble 
eternally2 true statements then eternally~ t'rue statements. Clearly, 
the B-statement is not timeless in precisely the same sense in which 
"Two plus two equals four" is timeless: the B-statement could not 
be true if time does not exist; that is, if there are no temporal 
relations between events. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the 
truth of the B-statement is based upon something that exists at 
every time. On the Russellian view, a true B-statement resembles a 
permanently2 or eternally2 true statement in two ways. First, 
B-statements represent states of affairs that contain a temporal 
relation which is a universal that does not exist in time. In other 
words, a Russellian temporal relation can exist "independently" 
of time, which is not to assert the contradiction that temporal 
relations can exist even if they do not exist, but rather to say that 
temporal relations can and do exist even though they are not tem- 
porally related to anything. Furthermore, although the event of 
Plato's death and the event of Aristotle's death can be thought of 
as obtaining at certain times, the whole temporal state of  affairs, 
Plato's death is earlier than Aristotle's death, like the state of affairs 
that two plus two equals four, neither stands in temporal realtion 
to anything nor obtains at certain times not obtains at everytime. 
Thus, for the Russellian, temporal relations are unanalyzable and 
B-statements represent states of affairs that more closely resemble 
eternal2 states of affairs than eternal1 states of affairs. 
According to the McTaggartian, however, temporal relations 
are analyzable and the statements that express the analysis closely 
resemble eternal~ statements. As previously mentioned, Schlesinger 
himself offers a definition of a temporal relational B-statement that 
will explain my point. He says, 
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P is before Q -- P is past at t and Q is present at t and t is in the 
present or P is past at t and Q is present at t and t is in the past 
or P is past at t and Q is present at t and t is in the futurefl  
According to Schlesinger each of the disjuncts in the definiens are 
A-statements, that is, statements that change their truth value with 
time. But if each of the disjuncts are A-statements then the states of  
affairs referred to by each of the disjuncts must obtain or occur in 
time. In other words, there is not a single state of affairs that exists 
outside of the net of  temporal relations or thoughout all of  eternity 
that is the basis of "P is before Q" being true, but rather its basis is a 
state of affairs or series of such that collectively obtain throughout 
all of history. Thus, for McTaggart, temporal relational B-statements 
more closely resemble permanentlyz true or false statements than 
permanently2 true or false statements. 
This point is reinforced by noticing that on McTaggart's view it 
follows that there must be not only a single A series, but a sequence 
of A series. The argument is stated by R. Gale: 
It can easily be shown that if there is one A-series there must 
be a series of A-series. Assume that the A-series consists of 
events M, N and O, which are respectively past, present, and 
future. A past (future) event by definition is one which was 
(will be) present. Therefore, there was (will be) an A-series in 
which M (0)  is present. Thus, if there is one A-series there is 
becoming - a series of  A-series. 4a 
Thus, for Schlesinger, Gale, and other McTaggartians, B-statements 
such as "P is earlier than Q" are always~ or permanently~ true 
because there is at every momen t  an A-series that is the basis for its 
truth. Schiesinger by not distinguishing the two kinds of "perma- 
nently'" true or false B-statements fails to recognize that although 
McTaggart and Russell agree that B-statements are permanent, they 
fundamentally disagree on their analyses of temporal relations. 
Schlesinger's failure to distinguish the two kinds of permanence is 
also at the root of his argument against Russell to which we are now 
ready to turn. 
The key premise in Schlesinger's argument against Russell is that 
for Russell "time is essentially like space in which all relations are 
fixed." On the basis of this premise he reasons that since we would 
385 
L. NATHAN OAKLANDER 
not have different attitudes towards objects that are at the same 
spatial distance to our left or to our right, we should not have 
different attitudes towards experiences that are at the same temporal 
distance in the direction of earlier or later. The core of Schlesinger's 
argument can be stated slightly differently. Since spatial relations 
obtain among terms that exist at the same t ime if one thinks of  
space as the relations between and among places, i.e., individuals 
that exist at every time, then spatial relations between particulars are 
permanently~ fixed: they obtain between particulars that exist at 
every time. Further, if time is essentially like space then it is an 
easy step to thinking that all temporal relations between particulars 
are fixed in the same way as all spatial relations between places are 
fixed, namely, permanentlyl fixed. Then, since at every m o m e n t  
the same series of events exists in the same unchanging relations, 
it follows that there is no movement of time in the direction of the 
future to the present and so there is no justification for our different 
attitudes towards future and past experiences. At this juncture the 
McTaggartian view introduces the moving present that inexorably 
shifts its position along the fixed series of events toward the future 
and away from the past. Hence, Schlesinger claims that McTaggart's 
view is preferable to Russell's since it can justify our different atti- 
tudes toward the past and the future and our belief in time's move- 
ment, whereas Russell's view cannot justify these attitudes and 
beliefs. 
The fundamental flaw in Schlesinger's argument is that it requires 
that the crucial premise ("time is essentially like space") be under- 
stood in such a way that for the Russellian "P is earlier than Q" is 
a permanent1 B-statement, that is, a statement that is made true by 
something that obtains at every t ime. But that is not Russell's view 
and Schlesinger could only think it is if he confused Russell's view of  
temporal relations with McTaggart's. According to McTaggart, in a 
world without the moving present or the A series, there would not 
be a B series, although there could still be a non-temporal series with 
the same logical properties as the generating relation of the B series, 
e.g., the series of integers. Thus, Schlesinger would be correct in 
maintaining that if there are two experiences at an equal "distance" 
from a given position in a non-temporal series, then without the 
movement of the "now" toward one and away from the other there 
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would be no reason to care in which direction the experience lies. 
Nevertheless, Schlesinger cannot appeal to that truism in rejecting 
Russell's view since on the Russellian theory of time experiences are 
located in a temporal series, i.e., a series whose generating relation is 
earlier (later) than. Consequently, even without a moving "now" it 
makes all the difference in the world if at t2, an unpleasant 
experience is going to occur at a later time (t3) or if it occurred at an 
earlier time ( t t ) .  Whether an experience takes place earlier or later 
than now, i.e., earlier or later than the time at which we utter the 
word "now," makes all the difference concerning our attitude 
toward it. 
In support of  Schlesinger's criticism of Russell's view one might 
reply that all he says is that time is like space in this one respect, 
that just as there is no special spatial particular like the "here" 
there is no special temporal particular like the moving "now." This 
is true, but from it, it does not follow that earlier than and later than 
are symmetrical with respect to my position in the sense that I am 
moving no more toward one direction than the other. At t2, I am 
moving toward the pleasant experience at t3 and away from the 
unpleasant experience at t~ because t3 is later than t2 and t~ is 
earlier than t2. To be sure, the movement does not involve a moving 
"now," but it does have a basis in reality, namely, in the simple 
temporal relations of earlier than and later than. 
Russellians who have argued that it is completely wrong-headed 
to speak of time as "flowing," "moving," "marching" and the like, 
intend to reject Mc-Taggart's view of time or anything like it that 
attempts to reduce temporal relations to temporal becoming. The 
Russellian need not insist, as Schlesinger maintains, that "time is 
no more flowing in one direction than in another. ''4a All he must 
claim is that the "'flow" of time is not to be understood along the 
lines suggested by MeTaggart or his followers. Time does move for 
the Russellian since events that are not now experienced by us 
will, at later times (later news) be experienced by us, and those 
experienced events at still later times will be remembered by us, 
perhaps with nostalgia. It is the having of different experiences 
at different news that constitutes our experience of time's move- 
ment, and it is out experience of time's movement that is the basis 
of our differing attitudes toward past and future events. Thus, the 
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Russellian theory of time can justify our different attitudes towards 
the past and the future, Sctdesinger's argument notwithstanding. 
Although Schlesinger's arguments do not refute the Russellian 
view he offers another important reason for preferring McTaggart's 
view over Russell's. According to Schlesinger, our attitude of relief 
when we contemplate an unpleasant experience that we know has 
happened in the past, and our attitude of dread when we contem- 
plate an unpleasant experience that we know will happen in the 
future are self-explanatory on McTaggart's view. These attitudes are 
self-explanatory on McTaggart's view because for McTaggart "it is 
legitimate to think of events as engaged in the process of  moving 
away from or toward the present. '~4 But does the notion of events 
moving away from or toward the present really make intelligible 
our different attitudes toward the past and the future? The answer 
depends on how we are to understand the notion of "events mov- 
ing." Schlesinger himself sympathetically considers some of the 
major objections to McTaggart's account of the movement of time. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to say that there are "some reasons why 
it is impossible to give an account of the movement of  time in terms 
of which movement is normally understood. ' ~  How then is the 
movement of time to be understood? The natural answer is that such 
movement is to be explained in the way in which commentators 
and other followers of  McTaggart have explained it. Unfortunately, 
it is far from obvious that the alternative A-theory accounts of 
time's movement are any more intelligible or shed any more light on 
our different attitudes, than McTaggart's. For example, at one point 
in his career Broad understood the movement of time in terms of the 
"sum total of existence . . .  always increasing ' ~  and "the ever- 
lengthening temporal order of the universe, 'aT but such accounts are 
either circular or mistaken since they depend upon a literal and 
pernicious spatialization of time. Broad's later account of  becoming 
does not elucidate the concept either for he says, "To become 
present is, in fact, just to become, in an absolute sense; i.e., to 
"come to pass" in the Biblical phraseology, or, most simply, to 
happen. ''4s Yet an appeal to the Bible does not help me in under. 
standing becoming. Nor do the more recent A-theory accounts of 
time's movement shed any more light on the concept. Gale, fo r  
instance, concludes his book on time by saying that we cannot 
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hope to understand (absolute) becoming in terms of  qualitative 
change or any other not ion since becoming is a sui generis notion.  49 
But if  we say that becoming is suigeneris, then how does the reality 
of  becoming make our different at t i tudes towards the past and the 
future self-explanatory? There are other A-theory accounts of  t ime's  
movement although Schlesinger does not ment ion them, nor does he 
give an alternative account of  how we are to understand the move- 
ment  of  time. Thus, it is far from evident that McTaggart's and other 
A-theorists talk of  events moving toward or away from the present 
does make self-explanatory our different at t i tudes toward the past 
and the future. As we have shown, the Russellian view does offer an 
intelligible account of  t ime's movement that is quite unlike 
McTaggart's. Thus is would appear that a careful consideration of  
the Russellian and the McTaggartian theories of  time reveals not 
only that Schlesinger's arguments do not refute Russell 's view, but  
more important ly ,  and contrary to what Schlesinger would have us 
believe, it is the Russellian view that it preferable to McTaggart's. 
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